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I. Introduction
Have you ever found yourself at a restaurant or a bar, looking
to quench your thirst with a nice craft beer? If you have, you may
have had the wait staff recite a lengthy selection of beers, or have
been confronted with a long list of craft brews, from different
locations and breweries, each likely represented by a distinct
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name—a name that is most likely trademarked.1 Often, the
distinct names of beers and breweries significantly influence the
consumer about which “cold one” to order.2 Due to the significance
of branding and marks within the craft beer industry, the survival
of a brewery relies heavily on its ability to properly protect its
trademarks.3 This Note will focus on one method of protection—
trademark coexistence agreements that are negotiated between
two breweries.
Smaller companies such as craft breweries often decide to
enter into contractual agreements (referred to as “consent
agreements” or “coexistence agreements”) with one another in an
effort to avoid costly litigation over trademarking.4 Generally,
trademark coexistence agreements are contractual agreements
allowing “potentially confusing trademarks to coexist in the
market without trademark infringement lawsuits.”5
1. See Alastair Bland, Craft Brewers are Running Out of Names, and Into
Legal
Spats,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Jan.
15,
2015,
9:08
AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/01/05/369445171/craft-brewers-arerunning-out-of-names-and-into-legal-spats (last visited Nov. 15, 2016)
(explaining that “[v]irtually every large city, notable landscape feature, creature
and weather pattern of North America—as well as myriad other words, concepts
and images—has been snapped up and trademarked as the name of either a
brewery or a beer”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Ulrich R. Orth et al., Promoting Brand Benefits: The Role of
Consumer Psychographics and Lifestyle, 21 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 97, 98 (2004)
(“Craft beers are such an object with relatively few attributes that physically
differentiate products, and brand names have been shown to have considerable
importance in the purchase decision.”).
3. See Why It’s Important for Craft Brewers to Register, GERBEN L. FIRM
PLLC (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.gerbenlaw.com/blog/why-its-important-forcraft-brewers-to-register-trademarks/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2017) (“That increasing
popularity, however, means an increasingly crowded marketplace, and with it,
more competition for trademarks and naming rights, and an increased need for
protection of brewery names and beer brands, both established and new.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Martin City Brewing May Finally Get its Hard Way IPA trademark
Registered, KAIDER L. (Feb. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Martin City Brewing],
http://www.kaiderlaw.com/blog/category/all (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (“A
‘consent agreement,’ for example, is a common device to resolve a trademark
dispute . . . These agreements are more common between two parties of more or
less equal size (two craft breweries, for example.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
5. Marianna Moss, Trademark “Coexistence” Agreements: Legitimate
Contracts or Tools of Consumer Deception?, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 197, 197
(2005).
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Trademark infringement lawsuits generally arise when there
is a question as to whether the use of a certain trademark creates
a likelihood of confusion with another mark.6 In other words, the
inquiry is whether “one mark [is] so close to another that an
ordinary purchaser is likely to be confused, mistaken, or deceived
regarding the source of the goods or service.”7 Due to the fact that
trademark coexistence agreements are contracts made and
contemplated by the two potentially affected parties,8 the Federal
Circuit—the court that reviews decisions from the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)9—has maintained a longstanding
opinion that trademark coexistence agreements should carry
“great weight” when the TTAB performs a “likelihood of confusion”
analysis to determine the legitimacy of a mark.10 In fact, in
Bongrain International Corp. v. Delice De France, Inc., the Federal
Circuit states:
We have often said, in trademark cases involving agreements
reflecting parties’ views on the likelihood of confusion in the
marketplace, that they are in a much better position to know
the real life situation than bureaucrats or judges and therefore
such agreements may, depending on the circumstances, carry
great weight, as was held in DuPont. Here, the board appears
effectively to have ignored the views and conduct of the parties
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (providing that any person who uses
any term, name, symbol, device, or combination in commerce, shall be civilly
liable if he or she is likely to cause confusion of another’s mark).
7. George Miaoulis & Nancy D’Amato, Consumer Confusion & Trademark
Infringement, 42 J. OF MARKETING 48, 49 (1978) (“To make a judgment with regard
to infringement, the court would like to know what is in the customer’s mind, how
he is reacting to the two marks, and thus whether he is likely to be deceived.”).
8. See David Allen Bernstein, Note, A Case for Mediating Trademark
Disputes in the Age of Expanding Brands, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 139,
144–45 (2005) (“In some cases, companies are willing to compromise, which allows
both parties to continue to use the brand in separate product or service areas.
This compromise, also known as consent to use agreement, is the optimal
solution . . . .”).
9. See CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, 267 F.3d 660, 674 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
Lanham Act provides two avenues for review of TTAB decisions: review by the
Federal Circuit on the closed record of the TTAB proceedings; or review by the
district court with the option of presenting additional evidence and claims.”).
10. See Bongrain Int’l Corp. v. Delice De France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1484–
85 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that in trademark cases involving coexistence
agreements, “great weight” should be given to the agreement when performing a
confusion analysis because the parties have a more practical understanding of the
marketplace than “bureaucrats or judges”).
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merely because it harbored a different view from the parties on
likelihood of confusion.11

Therefore, the Federal Circuit finds that if the parties do not
believe that coexisting use will cause a confusion in the
marketplace, then it likely will not occur, and the TTAB need not
substitute its judgment for that of the parties.12
On February 25, 2016, the TTAB rendered a decision of great
importance to the craft brewing industry when it affirmed a ruling
from the United States Patent and Trademarks Office (USPTO).
The USPTO refused to register the trademark TIME TRAVELER
BLONDE on the grounds of confusion with the previously
registered mark TIME TRAVELER despite an extensive
trademark coexistence agreement between the two breweries.13
Bay State Brewing Company (Bay State), a small Massachusetts
brewery, sought registration on the principal register for the mark
of TIME TRAVELER BLONDE,14 in standard characters, for
“beer” within International Class 32, a trademark class that
includes beers, mineral and aerated waters, and other nonalcoholic beverages.15 A&S Brewing, a Vermont-based brewing
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., id. at 1485
Likelihood of confusion under § 2(d) is, as the board said, a question of
law and as such it is freely reviewable by us. Our review of this case,
particularly considering the views of the parties on what actually
happens and is likely to happen in the marketplace as it affects their
respective businesses, constrains us to disagree with the board.
13. See In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *4
(T.T.A.B. 2016) (citing to the Appellant’s brief).
In this case, Applicant and [Registrant] made ‘reasoned assessments
of the marketplace’ in a detailed agreement that is the Long Form
Agreement submitted on December 30. 2013. This Agreement . . . is a
non-naked, well-reasoned, and detailed agreement drafted by
knowledgeable parties intimately familiar with the market and eager
to avoid confusion. As is shown below the parties crafted an agreement
designed to avoid confusion in the marketplace and underscored the
agreement with a mutual commitment to collaborate in avoiding
confusion in the marketplace. This agreement should be given the
substantial and great weight as required by the Federal Circuit.
14. See id. at *1 (describing the procedural history of the case).
15. See International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of
the Registration of Marks, World Intellectual Property Organization (10th ed.
2011) (explaining that Class 32 includes mainly non-alcoholic beverages, as well
as beer).
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collaborative, successfully registered the mark TIME TRAVELER,
also in standard characters, for “‘beer, ale and lager’ in
International Class 32.”16 The USPTO trademark examining
attorney denied Bay State’s application on the grounds that, when
used for beer, it “so resembles the previously registered mark” of
A&S, it is “likely to cause confusion.”17 Following denial by the
USPTO, Bay State appealed for review by the TTAB.18 In its
appeal, Bay State emphasized that it had previously entered into
a consent agreement with A&S brewing that, if followed, would
eliminate confusion.19 After an in-depth analysis, the TTAB upheld
the USPTO decision to refuse registration of Bay State’s mark
notwithstanding the consent agreement, stating that “consumers
are likely to be confused upon encountering the marks TIME
TRAVELER BLONDE and TIME TRAVELER, both for ‘beer,’ even
when used in accordance with the consent agreement.”20
This Note focuses on the issue of what protections a trademark
coexistence agreement provides to companies within the craft
brewing industry in light of the recent TTAB ruling in In re Bay
State Brewing Company, Inc. In Part II, this Note provides an
overview of the craft brewing industry and its importance to the
United States economy.21 Part III offers an overview of coexistence
agreements as a function of contract law, while also giving a
primer on trademark law and discussing use within the craft
brewing industry.22 Part IV analyzes the decision in In re Bay State
Brewing Company, Inc. and its serious consequences for the craft
brewing industry, while also focusing on the likelihood of confusion
analysis for the craft brewing industry as a whole.23 Finally, Part
V examines the specific Trademark Coexistence Agreement with
16. In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *1 (T.T.A.B.
2016)
17. Id.
18. See id. (explaining that when the examining attorney made refusal final,
Bay State appealed to the TTAB).
19. See id. (“Applicant asserts that it has a consent agreement with
Registrant, and asserts that ‘the parties acknowledge that confusion is likely
unless they both adhere to the terms of the [agreement].’”).
20. Id. at *10.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.
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In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc. and uses it as an example
to discuss the future implications for trademark coexistence
agreements in the craft brewing industry in light of the new level
of scrutiny provided by the TTAB’s decision.24
II. Overview of the Craft Brewing Industry Recent Growth of the
Craft Brewing Industry
The beer market in America is as healthy as it has ever been.
In 2015, “the number of operating breweries in the U.S. grew
fifteen percent, totaling 4,269 breweries — the most at any time in
American history.”25 Many individuals likely associate the term
“craft beer” with any beer that is not “‘Big beer’ (or
‘MillCoorWeiser’26), the beer produced by Anhueser-Busch InBev
(ABI) and MillerCoors, which are the two major producers of malt
beverages in the United States.”27 That being said, the Brewer’s
Associations—a trade organization that represents “small and
independent American craft brewers”28—defines a craft brewer as:
An American craft brewer is small, independent and
traditional. Small: Annual production of 6 million barrels of
beer or less (approximately 3 percent of U.S. annual beer sales).
24. See discussion infra Part V.
25. Small and Independent Brewers Continue to Grow Double Digits,
BREWERS ASS’N (March 22, 2016) [hereinafter Small and Independent Brewers
Continue to Grow], https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/smallindependent-brewers-continue-grow-double-digits/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Adam Millsap, Craft Brewing Has Brought Variety to Oktoberfest,
FORBES
(Sept.
20,
2016,
10:04
A.M.),
http://www.forbes.com/
sites/adammillsap/2016/09/15/craft-brewing-has-brought-variety-to-oktoberfest/
#763a6c1f468f (last visited Jan. 5, 2017) (“But it wasn’t too long ago that
American beer drinkers were largely limited to what beer buffs call
MillCoorWeiser beer—the mass produced American lager prominently sold under
the Budweiser, Miller, and Coors brand names.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
27. Kenneth G. Elzinga et al., Craft Beer in the United States: History,
Numbers, and Geography, 10 J. WINE ECON. 242, 244 (2015) (explaining further
that ABI and MillerCoors combined maintained a share of the market of beer
sales in the United States of 73% and craft beer maintains less than 10% of the
domestic market).
28. See BREWER’S ASS’N, Small and Independent Brewers Continue to Grow,
supra note 25.
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Beer production is attributed to the rules of alternating
proprietorships. Independent: Less than 25 percent of the craft
brewery is owned or controlled (or equivalent economic interest)
by an alcoholic beverage industry member that is not itself a
craft brewer. Traditional: A brewer that has a majority of its
total beverage alcohol volume in beers whose flavor derives
from traditional or innovative brewing ingredients and their
fermentation. Flavored malt beverages (FMBs) are not
considered beers.29

Within the definition of “craft brewer,” there are several subcategories
of
breweries:
microbreweries,30
brewpubs,31
nanobreweries,32 and regional craft breweries.33 The graphic
below, Figure II.A.1,34 demonstrates the growth of the craft
brewing industry by each segment of the craft brewing market.

29. Id. at n. 1.
30. See Elzinga et al., supra note 27, at 244 n. 2 (“Microbreweries sell their
output to a downstream vendor (i.e., a distributor or retailer).”).
31. See id. (“[B]rewpubs are vertically integrated and sell direct to the
consumer at the production point (i.e., its restaurant or bar).”).
32. See id. at 244 (“In the taxonomy of craft beer production, there also is the
nanobrewery, which, unlike home brewers, brews beer for resale but on a very
small scale (a capacity of three barrels or less).”).
33. See Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, BREWERS ASS’N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/market-segments/, (last visited
Nov. 17, 2016) (explaining that a regional craft brewery is a brewery, with an
annual beer production of between 15,000 and 6,000,000 barrels, with a majority
of volume in “traditional” or “innovative” beer) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
34. See Number of Breweries: U.S. Craft Brewery Count by Category,
BREWERS
ASS’N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/number-ofbreweries/, (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (providing various graphics representing
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With the rapid growth in the craft brewing industry, the
economic impact of the craft brewing industry is undoubted. In
fact, as of 2015, ninety-nine percent of American breweries (4,225)
are considered craft breweries and account for a retail value
estimated at $22.3 billion.35 Additionally, craft breweries do not
only produce great beer—they also produce great jobs.36 In 2015,
craft brewers provided nearly 122,000 jobs, which was a 6,000 job
increase from 2014.37
A. Local Impacts of Craft Beer
Craft breweries have a strong economic impact at the local,
state, and national levels.38 In fact, craft brewers contributed $55.7
billion to the United States economy in 2014.39 This contribution is
tremendous when compared to the contribution of $33.9 billion to
the economy in 201240—a testament to how much the industry has
recently grown. Figure II.A.241 represents the economic impact
that craft breweries have on each state.
the number of breweries in the United States) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
35. See BREWERS ASS’N, Small and Independent Brewers Continue to Grow,
supra note 25 (providing statistical figures that demonstrate the growth of the
craft brewing industry in 2015).
36. See id. (“Small and independent brewers are a beacon for beer and our
economy . . . . As breweries continue to open and volume increases, there is a
strong need for workers to fill a whole host of positions at these small and growing
businesses.”).
37. See id. (describing the economic impacts as a result of the craft brewing
business).
38. See Economic Impact, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.
org/statistics/economic-impact-data/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (“With a strong
presence across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, craft breweries are a
vibrant and flourishing economic force at the local, state, and national level.”).
39. See id. (explaining that his figure is “derived from the total impact of
beer brewed by craft brewers as it moves through the three-tier system
(breweries, wholesalers, and retailers), as well as all non-beer products like food
and merchandise that brewpub restaurants and brewery taprooms sell”).
40. See Neil Reid & Jay D. Gatrell, Brewing Growth, 14 ECON. DEV. J. 5, 7
(2015) [hereinafter Brewing Growth] (“In 2012, the industry contributed $33.9
billion to the U.S. economy and was responsible for more than 360,000 jobs . . . .”).
41. Economic Impact, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/
statistics/economic-impact-data/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (on file with the
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As seen in Figure II.A.2, the craft brewing industry generates
the most economic output from larger states: California,
Pennsylvania, Texas, New York, and Colorado, form the top five
producing states in 2014.42 However, the craft brewing industry
also has economic impacts on smaller states, with Colorado,
Oregon, Vermont, Pennsylvania, and Alaska making up the top
five states based off of economic output per capita.43
Expansion of the craft brewing industry has also created a
tourism niche as people travel to visit craft breweries.44 As a result
of growing beer tourism, many communities have developed “craft
beer trails” that provide suggested itineraries for visiting
breweries in the area.45 These craft beer trails not only improve
Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. See id. (providing the following economic outputs: California ($6.9
billion), Pennsylvania ($4.5 billion), Texas ($3.8 billion), New York ($2.9 billion),
Colorado ($2.7 billion)).
43. See id. (explaining that this figure is calculated per capita for adults over
the age of 21).
44. See Jennifer Francioni Kraftchick et al., Understanding Beer Tourist
Motivation, 12 TOURISM MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 41, 41 (2014) (“A beer tourist’s
primary motivation for travel is to visit a brewery, beer festival, or beer show in
order to experience the beer-making process and/or tasting of beer.”).
45. See Reid & Gatrell, supra note 40, at 8 (2015) (providing examples of
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local economies and promote travel, but also promote collaboration
in between breweries—a trend that causes brands to overlap and
contributes to the collegial atmosphere of the craft brewing
industry. 46
In an effort to attract new breweries, some states have
changed local laws.47 Such local changes are helpful for attracting
breweries because “[l]aws governing the production, sale, and
consumption of beer vary significantly from state to state with
more restrictive laws placing some [less restrictive] states at a
competitive advantage.”48 The willingness of states to alter laws in
an effort to attract craft breweries demonstrates the importance of
craft breweries to states and their economies.
B. Legislative Incentives for Craft Beer
Because of the impact that craft breweries have on national
and state economies, governments at every level have taken
actions that effect the craft brewing industry. In 1978, Congress
reduced the federal excise tax on beer from $9.00/barrel to
$7.00/barrel for the first 60,000 barrels that were produced by
breweries with less than two million barrels in total annual sales.49
Additionally, at the time of this Note, legislation has been
introduced into both the United States Senate and House of
Representatives, under the title of the Craft Beverage
Modernization and Tax Reform Act of 2015. 50 The proposed
legislation has strong support from the industry because the act is
tailored to promote job creation in craft brewing.51 Among other
craft beer trails in Columbus, Ohio; Kalamazoo, Michigan; and Louisville,
Kentucky).
46. See id. (providing the example that “[i]n Mills River, NC, Sierra Nevada’s
popular ‘Beer Camp’ model, which builds on a collaborative co-branding initiative
with smaller craft houses . . . .” has had a positive impact on the local economy).
47. See id. at 10 (describing that in an effort to attract Stone Brewing
Company, South Carolina governor signed a bill that removed many restrictions
on craft breweries and discussing current legislation in Ohio that would raise the
state’s maximum ABV to 21 percent).
48. Id.
49. See Elzinga et al., supra note 27 at 244, n.2 (describing the reduction in
the federal excise tax as a “windfall for craft brewers”).
50. S.1562, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2903, 114th Cong. (2015).
51. See Federal Excise Tax Overview: Craft Beer Modernization and Tax
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aims, the legislation will reduce excise tax and regulatory burdens
for brewers, reducing the federal excise tax to $3.50/barrel on the
first 60,000 barrels for domestic brewers producing less than two
million barrels annually.52 This reduction in the excise tax will
create more cash flow for brewers, allowing for reinvestment in
their businesses and expansion of their breweries and expand
distribution.53 Additionally, the legislation would increase
collaboration between brewers by removing restrictions on tax-free
transfers of beer, repealing unnecessary inventory restrictions,
and allowing expansions of breweries for packaging and storage
facilities.54 These legislative effects are designed to help craft
breweries grow and expand by allowing small brewers to
collaborate on new beers by giving them the flexibility to transfer
beer between breweries without tax liability.55 With such
legislation being implemented to help the craft brewery industry
expand, the TTAB’s ruling in In re Bay State Brewing Company56
may restrict these aims and reduce the collaboration between
these breweries.

Reform Act of 2015, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/
government-affairs/craft-beverage-modernization-and-tax-reform-act/federalexcise-tax-overview/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (“The intent of the bill is to update
and modernize the excise tax and regulatory requirements for craft brewers as
well as vintners and distillers, and thereby help to ensure the continued growth
of America’s craft beverage industries.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
52. See id. (describing Section 201 of the bill introduced into the House of
Representatives and Section 201 of the bill introduced into the Senate).
53. See id. (explaining that Section 201 of the bill is designed to “[r]ecalibrate
excise taxes for brewers to provide more cash flow to allow them to reinvest in
their businesses”).
54. See id. (describing Section 204 of the bill introduced into the House of
Representatives and Section 204 of the bill introduced into the Senate).
55. See Majority of U.S. Senators Support Beer Tax Reform, BREWERS ASS’N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/majority-u-s-senatorssupport-beer-tax-reform/ (last updated Sept. 26, 2016) (last visited Jan. 6, 2016)
(discussing specific provisions within the introduced legislation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of In
re Bay State Brewing Company).
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C. Geographical Distribution of Craft Beer
While all Americans love beer, the distribution of craft
breweries is not even throughout the United States.57 Several
theories attempt to explain the uneven distribution of breweries
during the growth of the industry.58 One theory that may explain
this growth and distribution is the resource partitioning theory,
which explains that as a market expands, it divides into special
segments.59 Craft brewers have emerged to address the needs of a
certain segment.60 Neil Reid, a craft brewing expert who has
published multiple works on the topic, has stated that he is partial
to the resource partitioning theory because it “explains the
emergence of the craft beer industry as a response to consumer
dissatisfaction with American pale lager that has, up until
recently, dominated American palates.”61 Specifically, “craft beer
appears to resonate particularly strongly with the millennial
demographic cohort who seems attracted to its diversity of styles
and flavors.”62 Therefore, one explanation for the distribution of
the industry is that craft breweries have emerged in areas where
57. See Neil Reid et al., From Yellow Fizz to Big Biz: American Craft Beer
Comes to Age, 57 FOCUS ON GEOGRAPHY 114, 114 (Sept. 2014) [hereinafter From
Yellow Fizz to Big Biz] (“Growth of the craft brewing industry has been unevenly
distributed across both space and time. There are states where the industry has
a strong presence and those where it is weakly represented.”).
58. See id. (explaining that the emergence and growth of the craft brewing
industry is a result of resource partitioning and is part of a broader neo-localism
movement).
59. See id. (explaining the resource partitioning theory and how this theory
applies to the craft brewing industry).
60. See Neil Reid et al., Conference Paper, The Ubiquity of Good Taste: A
Spatial Analysis of the Craft Brewing Industry in the United States, 53rd
Congress of the European Regional Science Association: Regional Integration:
Europe, the Mediterranean and the World Economy, 4 (Aug. 2013) [hereinafter
Conference Paper] (“Over time, however, some consumers express dissatisfaction
with the homogeneous product and a market evolves for higher quality and
differentiated styles of beer.”).
61. See Neil Reid et al., From Yellow Fizz to Big Biz, supra note 57, at 114.
62. Id.; see also Reid et al., Conference Paper, supra note 60, at 4 (“Craft beer
is attractive to a discernable demographic. The typical consumer of craft beer is
male, white, earns at least $75,000 per year, works in the service sector, and is
college educated.”); Reid & Gatrell, supra note 40 (“[C]raft breweries tend to be
more numerous in metropolitan areas whose populations exhibit higher levels of
social tolerance, and where a greater share of those who live there are young (aged
25-44), educated, and non-Hispanic whites.”).
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it can best serve these distinct populations and satisfy the desires
for beers other than the typical MillCoorWeiser.63
Second, it appears that the craft brewing industry is a part of
a larger neo-localism movement that is defined as “the deliberate
seeking out of regional lore and local attachment by residents (new
and old) as a delayed reaction to the destruction in modern
America of traditional bonds to the community and family.”64 Craft
breweries are part of “the larger ‘buy-local’ movement that has
grown in popularity in recent years, particularly with respect to
the purchase of locally-grown food by ‘localvores.’”65 As a response
to this movement, many craft breweries attempt to capitalize on
local connections in advertising and marketing strategies.66 Such
advertising and marketing strategies “[c]reat[e] an attachment to
the local area, especially its history and landscape, [that] is often
reflected in the names that craft brewers chose for the portfolio of
beers that they brew.”67 The desire to use local names for their
beers limits brewery name choices and has created a trend for
creating trademark coexistence agreements with other breweries.
Unfortunately, this trend may be undermined by In re Bay State
Brewing Company, as will be discussed in detail in Part V of this
Note.68

63. See Reid et al., From Yellow Fizz to Big Biz, supra note 57, at 116 (“In
the case of the beer industry the craft brewers have emerged to meet this demand
for variety; a variety that is manifest in terms of greater choice with respect to
style, flavor, and strength of beer.”).
64. Id.
65. Reid et al., Conference Paper, supra note 60, at 6.
66. See Reid et al., From Yellow Fizz to Big Biz, supra note 57, at 117
(“[M]any craft breweries consciously foster the concept of neo-localism and have
purposefully catered to these cravings for connection through targeted marketing
strategies that emphasize local identity and distinctiveness.”).
67. Id. (providing an example that Great Lakes brewing Company in
Cleveland brews the Edmund Fitzgerald Porter, named after a Great Lakes
freighter (the SS Edmund Fitzgerald) that sank on Lake Superior during a storm
in 1975).
68. See infra Part V. Examination of Specific Trademark Coexistence
Agreement in In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc. and the Implications for
Future Coexistence Agreements in the Craft Brewing Industry (examining the
TTAB’s decision and the implications that the decision will have on the craft
brewing industry).
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The above mentioned theories may help explain the uneven
distribution of craft breweries throughout the United States.69 The

largest geographic concentrations of craft breweries are found in
the Pacific Northwest, California, the Northeast, the Great Lakes,
and the Mountain West.70 Figure II.A.371 below demonstrates the
Craft Beer Production by State since 1980.

69. See Reid et al., Conference Paper, supra note 60, at 5 (“The demographics
of the market may impact the geography of the industry as regions and locales
whose demographic and economic characteristics are attractive to craft brewers
are more likely to possess a higher number of microbreweries and brewpubs.”).
70. See Reid & Gatrell, Brewing Growth, supra note 40, at 6 (explaining that
the following cities are responsible for such geographic distribution: Seattle,
Portland, San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Sacramento, Riverside, New
York, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Minneapolis, Detroit,
and Denver).
71. Elzinga et al., supra note 27, at 261.
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Figure II.A.3 shows that the craft brewing industry has grown
exponentially since 1980, when there was only one craft brewer
outside of the state of California.72 Further, the above chart
demonstrates that “craft beer production moved sequentially into
the Pacific Northwest, the Northeast, and then the upper
Midwest.”73 Based on the time-lapsed geographic map, it is
apparent that craft brewing was slow to move into lower
Midwestern and Southern states and was not brewed in every
state until 2001.74 Additionally as Figure II.A.3 demonstrates, it is
evident that expansion of craft brewing is not random,75 and these
evolving clusters contribute to more overlapping distribution
markets within the craft brewing industry—an issue that the
TTAB acknowledges in In re Bay State Brewing Co. Inc.76
D. Continued Expansion of Craft Beer
As there are no indications that the expansion of craft brewing
will stop anytime soon, the geographical overlap and distribution
described above will likely become more crowded.77 The continuous
expansion of craft beer also includes successful and established
breweries that search for new production locations to expand their
markets.78 The expansion of such breweries hinges on some factors
72. See id. at 258 (explaining that craft beer originated in California, where
97% of craft beer was produced in 1980, as there was only one brewer outside of
the state who was located in Boulder, Colorado).
73. Id.
74. See id. at 260 (describing production of craft beer while also explaining
that a similar geographic pattern emerges when examining the number of craft
brewers per state as compared to the total production by state).
75. See id. (“The geographic distribution of craft beer appears to be anything
but random, raising the question: What caused the geographic clustering of
economic activity in craft brewing . . . ?”).
76. See In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *8
(T.T.A.B. 2016) (“[A]lthough Applicant’s use, by the terms of the agreement, is
limited to New York, a nationwide registration issued to the Applicant would give
Applicant presumptive nationwide exclusive rights.”); See also infra Part V.B.2
(examining the TTAB’s discussion of the geographic restrictions in Bay State
Brewing’s agreement).
77. See Reid et al., From Yellow Fizz to Big Biz, supra note 57, at 123–24
(“At the time of writing, the growth in the number of craft breweries shows no
sign of abating.”).
78. See Reid & Gatrell, Brewing Growth, supra note 40, at 6 (“[T]he need for
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that are directly related to a geographical area.79 For example, the
water content of a particular area is important in determining
location of a brewery because of the amount of water used in beer
production.80 Additionally, access to highways for transport and
distribution are important for breweries in deciding where to
expand their operation.81 Furthermore, factors that relate to the
demographics of the area, particularly to the neo-localism
movement, are important in determining future sites for breweries
and production facilities.82 As breweries expand their geographic
footprint, successful craft breweries become national brands,
which further crowds the market and provides more pressure on
branding and trademarking options for new and emerging
breweries.83

a second production location arises as the brewery is successful, demand for its
beer increases, and the geographic footprint of its market expands. As growing
breweries ship their product to more geographically distinct markets, their
transportation costs increase.”).
79. See id. at 10 (“[T]he historical factors that determine the geography of
site selection are changing.”).
80. See id. at 9
With water being a key ingredient of beer, Stone was particularly
interest in the type, availability, and quality of the water. The brewery
will use approximately 215,000 gallons of water per day. While water
treatment is now standard practice in the industry, water quality and
its specific characteristics—hardness, alkalinity, and chlorinity—
influence location.
81. See id. (“Access to interstate highways and concerns about water were
also important to Sierra Nevada Brewing Company when there were looking for
a second production location in the eastern United States.”).
82. See id. (“Indeed the traditional concept of a community’s ‘business
climate’ has now been expanded to include softer cultural factors (i.e., perceived
‘progressiveness’, availability of brownfield sites, sustainability, and so on) and
the political will to rapidly respond and revise arcane regulations.”).
83. See id. (“The expanding geographic footprint of these highly successful
craft breweries means that they are increasingly becoming national brands. For
example, New Belgium Brewing Company’s beer is available in 36 states plus
D.C., while Green Flash Brewing Company’s beer is sold in 40 states.”).
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1. Growth of the Craft Brewing Industry Has Led to
Trademarking and Naming Issues

As explained above, the craft brewing industry is growing at a
rapid pace.84 With a growing industry and a limited possible
number of names, brands, and labeling designs, many of which
have trademark protection, there will naturally be overlap in some
of the brands and names for certain beers.85 Arguably, the most
important aspect in having a successful beer (aside from taste) is
maintaining a successful brand name and image.86 The importance
of maintaining a successful brand combined with the large boom
in the craft brewing industry and the limited number of names,
brands, and designs, has led to an increase in trademark litigation
within the craft brewing industry.87 For brewery owners the
84. See supra Part I.A (explaining the recent growth of the craft brewing
industry and the economic impact that it has had).
85. See Sara Randazo, Hopportunity Cost: Craft Brewers Brawl Over Catchy
Names as Puns Run Dry, WALL STREET J. (July 10, 2016, 1:10 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/hopportunity-cost-craft-brewers-brawl-over-catchynames-as-puns-run-dry-1468170639 (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (detailing the
issues associated with numerous attempting to name beers with relevant puns)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally The Great Beer
Trademark Wars: Brewers Head to the Courts to Protect Their Brands, ALL ABOUT
BEER MAG., http://allaboutbeer.com/article/beer-trademarks/, (April 30, 2014)
(last visited September 7, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
86. See Ulrich R. Orth et al., Promoting Brand Benefits: The Role of
Consumer Psychographics and Lifestyle, 21 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 97, 98 (2004)
(“Craft beers are such an object with relatively few attributes that physically
differentiate products, and brand names have been shown to have considerable
importance in the purchase decision.”).
87. See Rebecca S. Winder, Note, Trademark Protection in the Craft Brewing
Industry: A Beer by Any Other Name May Be an Infringement, 15 WAKE FOREST
J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 148, 149 (2014)
While craft brewing focuses on using unique ingredients to create oneof-a-kind beers, there exists a limited universe of creative names for
breweries and their products. The limited naming options have become
strained as more and more craft breweries open every day in America
and more of the older, well-established craft breweries seek trademark
protection for their brand names. By seeking such protection, these
breweries are sending a message to the rest of the industry that they
are willing to use the legal system to protect their brands.
See also Carolyn Heneghan, Why Beverage Industry Lawsuits Are Increasing,
FOOD DIVE, http://www.fooddive.com/news/why-beverage-industry-lawsuits-areincreasing/411817/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (discussing how the rapid
expansion of the beverage industry has led to an increase in trademark disputes,
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thought of trademark litigation can be daunting and many owners
likely share the viewpoint of Matt Nadeau, the owner of Rock Art
Brewery based in Morrisville, Vermont, who expressed the
difficulties that breweries face when threatened with trademark
litigation:
The way the system is set up, I’m being explained by these
trademark lawyers, is that this will enter the court system and
this $1 billion corporation will be allowed to fight this in the
courts with dollars. If I win the first round, they can appeal.
And if I win the second round, they can appeal. And all the time,
this starts at $65,000 for each court case and goes and goes. And
at some point obviously, a small little Vermont brewery is not
going to be able to afford this anymore. And what happens at
that point when you’re involved in this legal battle and can no
longer afford to represent yourself, you lose by default. The
court system says you default lose. What happens then? I have
to change the name of the beer and move on if there’s any
brewery left.88

Matt Nadea’s description encompasses the fear that many
craft brewery owners face and, even when there may not be any
trademark infringement, craft brewery owners are often
overwhelmed by the threat of litigation and are advised by counsel
to take alternate courses of action.89 One such alternative is to
misleading claims, and distribution rights violations); Michael Kanach et. al, The
Brewhaha: Working with Craft Breweries for Trademark, Brand Protection, and
Other Issues, A.B. A. SECT. INTELL. PROP. L., (Mar. 27, 2015, 3:30 PM),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_proper
ty_law/2015/spring/materials/aba-ipl-brewhahacraftbeertrademarks-kanachpdf-combined.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited September 20, 2016) (discussing
recent disputes and indicating that the national median cost of trademark
litigation up through discovery is $151,000 and through trial is $300,000,which
demonstrates the incentive to enter into trademark coexistence agreements) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Robyn Ross, Trouble Brewing,
TEXAS MONTHLY (Jan. 2016), http://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/troublebrewing/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (analyzing a dispute between two Texas
Breweries and describing the steps and the consequences with regard to the
USPTO) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
88. Ross Appel, Worry Wort: A Path to Acquiring Trademark Rights in the
Craft Brewing Industry, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA, & ENT. L. J. 1030,
1045–46 (2015) (citing Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 625, 627–628 (2011)).
89. See id. at 1046 (“A Vermont attorney advised Nadeau that there was no
infringement but that he should consider his family, his employees, and the future
of the business and simply change the name.”); see also Winder, supra note 87, at
148 (“Having just started your own business, you do not have the excess funds
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enter into a trademark coexistence agreement with another
party90—the method that Bay State Brewing chose, which was
ultimately invalidated by In re Bay State Brewing Company.91

III. Overview of Trademark Coexistence Agreements
A. Trademark Law Primer
The Lanham Act of 1946 defines a trademark as “any word,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination” used or intended to
be used in commerce that can “identify and distinguish his or her
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown.”92 Trademark law serves dual goals—“to
protect consumers from deception and confusion over trade
symbols and to protect the plaintiff’s infringed trademark as
property.”93 Trademarks play an important economic role as they
encourage the production of quality products and reduce the
necessary to hire an attorney and take the dispute to court. Instead, you can
either work with the other brewer. . . or you can appeal to your. . . supporters. . .
attempt[ing] to get the other brewer to back down.”).
90. See Christina Sauerborn, Trademark Troubles Overflow for the Craft
Beer Industry, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA, & ENT. L. J. (Nov. 8, 2016),
http://www.fordhamiplj.org/2016/11/08/trademark-craft-beer-industry/
(last
visited Feb. 21, 2017) (explaining that “another workaround that can be used to
navigate trademark disputes is a ‘coexistence agreement,’ where two or more
parties consent to one another’s registrations and mutually plan how to
distinguish themselves in the marketplace”).
91. See supra Part IV. (discussing the TTAB’s analysis of In re Bay State
Brewing Company).
92. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (2006).
93. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 2016); see also S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.,
3 (1946)
The purpose underlying any trademark statute is twofold. One is to
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get
the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the
owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting
to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its
misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-established
rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner.
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customer’s costs of making purchasing decisions.94 Generally,
trademarks perform four functions that merit protection in the
courts.95 First, trademarks “identify one seller’s goods and
distinguish them from goods sold by others,” and second, they
“signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from or are
controlled by a single, albeit anonymous source.”96 Third,
trademarks “signify that all goods bearing the trademark are of an
equal level of quality” and fourth, they are used “as a prime
instrument in advertising and selling the goods.”97 It is also
important to note that a trademark represents the good will that a
business has built up.98 Therefore, trademarks are used to reduce
consumer confusion by clearly identifying the source of a good,
while also encouraging competition by granting producers
exclusive rights to use their trademarks and the good will
associated with them.99
Trademark law differs from other forms of intellectual
property law (such as patents, copyrights, or trade secrets) as
trademark law “does not depend upon novelty, invention,
discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires no fancy or
imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.”100 Instead,
trademark protection is awarded to an individual who is first to
use a distinctive mark in commerce.101 Thus, it is the use of a mark
in commerce that gives the originator of a mark trademark
protection.102

94. Id. at § 2:3 (4th ed. 2016).
95. Id. at § 3:2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. (“If this consumer satisfaction and preference is labeled ‘good
will,’ then a trademark is the symbol by which the world can identify that good
will.”).
99. Id. at § 2:1; see also MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2016, VOLUME II: COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
STATE IP PROTECTIONS, V-3 (2016) (describing that consumers largely rely on
trademarks in situations when it is difficult to inspect a product quickly and
cheaply to determine its quality).
100. LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 99, at V-4 (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
101. Id. at V-5.
102. Id. at V-6.
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Trademark registration is not required for trademark
protection, but registration on the USPTO Principal Register
provides presumptive evidence of trademark protection.103 Federal
trademark registration can be accomplished either through the
filing a use-based application,104 under 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), or an
intent-to-use application under § 1051(b). 105 If the application is
approved by the USPTO, the mark is placed on the USPTO
Principal Register, and the mark holder possesses an exclusive
right to use the trademark in connection with the particular good
or service for which it is registered.106 Essentially, this means that
a senior user of a registered mark may prevent subsequent users
from using the registered mark or one that is similar where there
is a likelihood of confusion between the two marks.107
Registration may also be acquired under the concurrent use
doctrine, which was codified into the Lanham Act in 1946 as 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d). The concurrent use doctrine “allows different
owners to use the same or similar marks in commerce under
certain circumstances.”108 The concurrent use doctrine arose out of
common law and made it possible for different users to create
similar marks independently of each other, providing a system
which did not punish a subsequent user who used the similar mark
in a geographically remote area and adopted the similar mark in
103. See id. at V-103 (explaining that the primary advantages to registration
are “nationwide constructive use and constructive notice, which cut off rights of
other users of the same or similar marks” and “the possibility of achieving
incontestable status after five years, which greatly enhances rights by
eliminating a number of defenses”).
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2002) (describing the procedure for the owner
of a trademark that is currently used in commerce to request registration of its
trademark on the principal register).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2002) (describing the procedure for a person
who has a good-faith bona fide intention to use a mark in commerce to request
registration of its trademark on the principal register).
106. See Winder, supra note 87, at 153 (explaining the process for acquiring
federal trademark registration on the principal register under the Lanham Act).
107. See LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 99, at V-5 (2016) (explaining the
importance of trademark protection for the senior user); see also id. at 153–54
(“After acquiring the mark, it is up to the mark holder to defend it by informing
users of confusingly similar marks that they must cease their potentially
infringing use of the mark.”).
108. David S. Barrett, The Future of the Concurrent Use of Trademarks
Doctrine in the Information Age, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 687, 688 (2001).
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an innocent manner using good faith.109 Indeed, this common law
doctrine has been defined as “the result of a court’s desire to find
an equitable balance between trademark users and the buyers of
the goods or services.”110

B. General Overview of Trademark Coexistence Agreements as a
Part of Contract Law
1. Trademark Coexistence Agreements Defined
Trademark coexistence agreements are creatures of contract
law which allow potentially confusing trademarks to coexist
without trademark infringement lawsuits.111 The International
Trademark Association (INTA) defines trademark coexistence
agreements as an “[a]greement by two or more persons that similar
marks can coexist without any likelihood of confusion; allows the
parties to set rules by which the marks can peacefully coexist.”112
A consent agreement is a form of coexistence agreement, which is
often abbreviated, however the two terms often are used
interchangeably.113 Trademark consent or coexistence agreements
109. See id. at 689–90 (providing a brief history of the concurrent use
doctrine).
110. Id. at 690.
111. See Moss, supra note 5, at 197 (describing the purpose of trademark
coexistence agreements which are often agreed upon between manufacturers of
similar products); see also Lawrence W. Greene, The Ties that Bind?
Considerations in Drafting and Maintaining U.S. Trademark Consent and
Coexistence Agreements, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/TheTiesThatBindConsiderationsinDraf
tingandMaintainingUSTrademarkConsentandCoexistenceAgreements.aspx (last
visited Feb. 1, 2017) (“Consent agreements and coexistence agreements are
indispensable tools for resolving present or possible future disputes between two
parties about the use and/or registration of arguably similar marks for related
goods or services.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
112. INTA Glossary, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, http://www.inta.org/
TrademarkBasics/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (also explaining
that “concurrent use agreement” is defined as an “[a]greement by two or more
persons to use the same mark in connection with the same or similar goods or
services; usually limited by geographic boundaries”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
113. See Consent or Coexistence? Deciding Which Trademark Agreement to
Use, Practical Law: Thomson Reuters (Jun. 3, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/7-
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may be introduced by parties attempting to obtain trademark
registration.114 While these agreements vary in form and
substance from case to case, “often, a consent agreement is the
trademark applicant’s best option for convincing the Examiner
that their proposed mark will not cause a likelihood of confusion
with the mark cited against their application.”115 A consent
agreement will often be considered by the examining attorney as
evidence that there is no likelihood of confusion.116
2. Judicial Interpretation of Trademark Coexistence Agreements
Trademark coexistence agreements carry more weight and
legal consequences in the United States than internationally.117 In
most international jurisdictions, coexistence agreements are used
as evidence in acquiring trademark registration, however, once a
mark is registered, the “useful life of the consent agreement can
come to an abrupt end.”118 On the contrary, in the United States,
569-3945 (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (explaining that a trademark consent
agreement is a relatively simple agreement where one party grants the other
consent to use and register a trademark whereas coexistence agreements are
more comprehensive, generally including use and registration limitations for both
marks involved in the agreement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
114. See Is a Co-Existence Agreement the Right Choice For Your Brand?, L.
OFF. JOSEPH C. MESSINA, http://www.ny-trademark-lawyer.com/is-a-co-existenceagreement-the-right-choice-for-your-brand.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2017)
(explaining the factors that a company or individual should weigh in determining
whether to enter into a trademark co-existence agreement) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
115. Id.
116. See id. (suggesting that the reasoning behind considering co-existence
agreements as evidence of no likelihood of confusion “is that the parties most
affected by potential consumer confusion are declaring that confusion will not
result”).
117. See Consent or Coexistence? Deciding Which Trademark Agreement to
Use, Practical Law: Thomson Reuters (Jun. 3, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/7569-3945 (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (explaining the more significant legal life of a
consent agreement in the United States as compared to many international
jurisdictions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See id. (describing that many international trademark offices focus on
acting in the public interest and are extremely discretionary in their acceptance
of consent agreements to allow a party to overcome a citation to the other party’s
mark, and once accepted the agreement essentially ends).

THE TTAB SHOULD DRINK A BEER AND RELAX

127

because trademark coexistence agreements “play a more
fundamental role in defining or redefining the scope of each party’s
trademark rights, they are given great weight by the USPTO.”119
As discussed above, the deference given to coexistence agreements
has been noted by the Federal Circuit, as it has stated that “in
trademark cases involving agreements reflecting parties’ views on
the likelihood of confusion in the marketplace, that they are in a
much better position to know the real life situation than
bureaucrats or judges and therefore such agreements may,
depending on the circumstances, carry great weight.”120
The Federal Circuit—the court that has jurisdiction to review
many TTAB decisions—is not the only court to give great deference
to trademark coexistence agreements, respecting the freedom of
parties to contract. For example, in Times Mirror Magazines v.
Field & Stream Licenses Co.,121 the Second Circuit refused to set
aside a trademark coexistence agreement.122 In the case, the
plaintiff sued for (among other things) breach of contract and
trademark infringement and sought cancellation of all contracts,
specifically the trademark coexistence agreement with the
defendant regarding the “FIELD & STREAM” mark.123 The
plaintiff contended that the trademark coexistence agreement
should have been voided because “they [would] inevitably cause
substantial confusion and thus injure the public interest.”124 The
plaintiff further argued that the district court erred by “requiring
injury to the public rather than simply a heightened showing of
confusion”—an argument that the Second Circuit found
unpersuasive.125 The Second Circuit held that “in order to obtain
119. See id. (discussing the fact that because trademark coexistence
agreements play a more prominent role in the United States than abroad, there
are more factors to consider when deciding whether to enter into an agreement
and how to draft such an agreement).
120. Supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
121. 294 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 2002).
122. See id. at 384 (“Because defendants acted within their rights under the
agreements and [plaintiff] has not shown that the public interest requires
rescission of the contracts, we affirm.”).
123. See id. at 388 (explaining the lawsuit and the district court decision that
upheld the trademark coexistence agreement as a valid and well-reasoned
agreement).
124. Id. at 395.
125. See id. (explaining the reasoning of the court and discussing that
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rescission of a freely bargained trademark contract, a party must
show that the public interest will be significantly injured if the
contract is allowed to stand.”126 The court reasoned that “simple
fairness” requires an adherence to contracts unless that “will
damage the public and not just a contracting party.”127
Additionally, the Second Circuit explicitly states that the public
interest will not be significantly injured if confusion causes
members of the public “to buy products of equal quality that do not
threaten their health of safety” and as a result, the trademark
coexistence agreement shall be upheld.128 Using the rationale of
the Second Circuit, it would seem that a trademark coexistence
agreement between two breweries (such as the agreement in In re
Bay State Brewing Co., Inc.) for the names of beer, would never
rise to the level of causing significant injury to the public interest,
as confusion would only cause a consumer to purchase the wrong
beer (a product of equal quality) and would not threaten the
consumer’s health or safety.129
Similar to the Second Circuit, the TTAB—the administrative
body that decided In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc.—has also given
great deference in the past to trademark coexistence agreements.
In Ron Cauldwell Jewelry, Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes, Inc.,130 the
TTAB granted summary judgment on behalf of an applicant who
filed to register the mark EYE CANDY for use on fashion
accessories.131 The opposer, who had a previously used mark EYE
CANDY for the use on similar fashion products,132 contended that
trademark agreements are favored under the law and “courts considering
negotiated agreements governing mark use accord them greater deference than
they give to equitable defenses . . .”).
126. Id. at 396.
127. Id.
128. See id. (explaining further that in the absence of significant harm to the
public, a plaintiff should not be permitted to void the contractual terms of a
trademark coexistence agreement).
129. See id. (discussing that the district court correctly upheld the contract
because a purchase of a similar product would not threaten the health or safety
of the public).
130. 2002 WL 745591 (T.T.A.B.2002).
131. See id. at *1 (explaining that the applicant is being opposed for
registration of mark by an opposer who has a similar mark pending application,
but the two parties have previously entered into a trademark coexistence
agreement).
132. See id. (explaining that the opposer’s mark was for “retail stores
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the applicant’s mark should not be registered because it was "likely
to cause confusion, mistake or deception.”133 Prior to application,
the applicant and the opposer entered into a trademark
coexistence agreement, which among other things, stipulated that
the opposer would not object to the application for the EYE
CANDY mark and in return the applicant would not object to the
opposer using EYE CANDY as a store name in New York City.134
Applicant argued that registration should be permitted due to the
terms of the trademark coexistence agreement—an agreement
that opposer contended was ambiguous and without
consideration.135 The TTAB reached its conclusion that
registration should be permitted solely on the basis of the
trademark coexistence agreement.136 Consequently, in basing its
decision solely on a contractual agreement, the TTAB did not
consider “any outside policy questions, such as consumer
confusion, injury to public interest, etc.”137 After acknowledging
the existence of a coexistence agreement, the TTAB only concerned
itself with contractual issues—once it found that the coexistence
agreement was clear and unambiguous on its face, it had no
problem in granting summary judgment for the applicant.138
Additionally, the TTAB addressed the contention that no
consideration was given for the agreement, and found that there is
no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the consideration
for the trademark coexistence agreement.139 In responding to the
consideration argument, the TTAB noted that “the coexistence
featuring jewelry, watches, money clips, cuff links, key chains, clocks, handbags,
purses, shawls, scarves, gloves, and decorative hair clips and pins . . .”).
133. Id.
134. Id. at *3.
135. Id. at *3–4.
136. See id. at *5 (“After careful consideration of the short, two-page
coexistence agreement, the arguments and evidentiary submission presented by
each party, we find that applicant has met its burden on summary
judgment . . . and that it is entitled to registration as a matter of law.”).
137. Moss, supra note 5, at 210.
138. See Ron Cauldwell Jewelry, Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes, Inc., 2002 WL
745591, *5 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (explaining that the appropriate way to interpret an
agreement is not on the subjective intention of the parties, but rather on the
objective words of the parties and if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on
its face, it should be upheld).
139. Id. at *5.
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agreement itself evidences consideration” as both parties give up
rights when entering into such an agreement and thus form a valid
contract.140
The previously described opinions demonstrate the
willingness of courts to accept and give deference to trademark
coexistence agreements on the grounds of contract law.141
Following the logic of the Time Mirror Magazine and Ron
Cauldwell Jewelry, courts should balance the public interest while
giving weight to the “freedom and sanctity of contracts.”142
Ultimately, while marks may be similar and potentially lead to
consumer confusion, trademark coexistence agreements provide
protection (at least in some jurisdictions) based off of the
agreement, as long as the confusion would not significantly injure
the public and the agreement appears to meet all requirements for
a proper contract.
C. Trademark Coexistence Agreement Use Within the Craft
Brewing Industry
Trademark coexistence or consent agreements are often used
in the craft brewing industry to attempt to avoid trademark
disputes.143 Consent agreements allow parties to negotiate a deal
that allows for their trademarks to peacefully coexist in a manner
that avoids a likelihood of confusion.144 With the expansion of the
craft brewing industry and the natural overlap of names and
brands, it is beneficial for smaller breweries to enter into mutually
beneficial consent agreements.145 As a result, many breweries
140. See id. at *5 (explaining that in “exchange for opposer not objecting to
applicant’s use and registration, applicant indicated that opposer’s use for its
store was acceptable” constituted consideration for the agreement).
141. See, e.g., id. at *5 (describing the review of the coexistence agreement
as a contract).
142. See Moss, supra note 5, at 221 (discussing that coexistence agreements
should be evaluated on a “sliding scale,” largely depending on whether confusion
would cause serious injury to the public interest, such as health issues caused by
purchasing the wrong medication).
143. See Martin City Brewing, supra note 4 (describing the usefulness of a
trademark coexistence agreement in the craft brewing industry).
144. See supra Part III.B (providing background information on trademark
coexistence agreements).
145. See Benefits and Risks of Trademark Coexistence Agreements,
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enter into coexistence agreements as a “surefire strategy for
getting a trademark registration in the face of a likelihood of
confusion refusal.”146
One explanation for why trademark consent agreements are
appealing to the craft brewing industry is the unique culture that
the industry embodies.147 Because most craft breweries are small,
they often “do not have the resources to mass market their
products, so instead, they focus their energy to the local
community, tailoring their distribution to local bars, restaurants,
and beer festivals” and cultivate local community support.148
Additionally, the craft brewing industry is one based on
collaboration, as many breweries work together to brew beer and
launch new products.149 Collaboration brews are usually beneficial
for both brewers involved as it gives the parties an opportunity to
share brewing expertise and creativity “while simultaneously
supporting each other by providing access to markets that each
brewer would normally be unable to reach.”150 The combination of
local support and collaboration are key aspects that make the craft
brewing industry one that is close-knit and collegial.151
PRACTICAL LAW: THOMSON REUTERS (Sep. 16, 2013), http://us.practicallaw.com/4540-5507?q=&qp=&qo=&qe= (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (explaining that
trademark coexistence agreements can be a “cost-effective and efficient way to
resolve an actual or potential conflict”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
146. Cynthia A. Moyer, 99 Bottles of Beer on the Wall—2 With the Same
Name, LAW 360 (Mar. 17, 2016, 11:24 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
770574/99-bottles-of-beer-on-the-wall-2-with-the-same-name?article_related_
content=1 (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
147. See Winder, supra note 87, at 152 (explaining that the history and size
of the craft brewing industry has led to a “unique culture where members
collaborate with one another”).
148. Id.
149. See Martin Johnson, Collaborative Brewing is Heating Up in the Beer
World, EATER (Jun. 5, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.eater.com/drinks/2015/6/5/
8734935/collaborative-brewing-is-heating-up-in-the-beer-world (last visited Feb.
22, 2017) (“Retail buyers, bar managers, industry consultants and brewers all
agree that cooperative brewing is a fast growing trend. Breweries working
together to create a unique product ‘doesn’t happen on this level in any other
alcoholic beverage’ category.”).
150. Winder, supra note 87, at 152.
151. See id. (“This culture of collaboration and the cultivation of local
community support are key characteristics that have combined to create a close-
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The sense of camaraderie that the industry demonstrates in
its brewing translates over to how breweries often approach
potential trademark issues with other breweries.152 For example,
when Molly Izo, Associate Marketing Manager for Deschutes
Brewery, was asked how the brewery approaches potentially
infringing trademark uses by other breweries, she responded:
Typically we would contact counsel on such issues, but it’s not
our policy to send out cease and desist letters. Because craft is
what it is and represents the community it does, we typically
try to reach out first to create common ground . . . We try to use
the friendly approach because we never want to be the big bad
guys saying ‘you need to stop using this right away.’ 153

Molly Izo further explained that when Deschutes is contacted
by other breweries about their own trademark use, though
Deschutes has performed extensive searches of all their names,
“there’s always the off-chance that there’s another brewery that’s
been using the mark.”154 In these instances, Deschutes does its
“best to try to work out some sort of coexistence agreement. It
doesn’t always work that way, but it definitely does nine times out
of ten.”155 The example of Deschute’s policies sheds light on the
camaraderie of the craft brewing industry even when dealing with
legal matters and demonstrates why entering into a trademark
coexistence agreement is an attractive option for many craft
brewers—an option that is threatened by the ruling in In re Bay
State Brewing Company. The remainder of this Note addresses
the issue of what protections, if any, a trademark coexistence
agreement provides to craft breweries in light of the recent (TTAB)
ruling in In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc.

knit industry with a strong sense of camaraderie.”).
152. See Molly Izo, Deschutes Brewery: How the Craft Brew Boom is
Changing the Industry’s Trademark Game, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (Sep. 15.
2016), http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/Deschutes_Brewery_Interview
_7116.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (explaining how Deschutes Brewery, which
is located in Oregon, deals with trademark issues while “tak[ing] pride in the fact
that the craft beer industry has typically been characterized by camaraderie and
collaboration”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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IV. Analysis of In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc.
As discussed earlier , the TTAB issued a precedential decision
on February 25, 2016 that denied applicant Bay State Brewing
Company registration for the mark TIME TRAVELER
BLONDE.156 The registration was refused “on the ground that
Applicant’s mark, when used for Applicant’s goods, so resembles
the previously registered mark TIME TRAVELER . . . for ‘beer,
ale, and lager’ . . . as to be likely to cause confusion.”157 The refusal
to register was made despite the fact that a consent agreement
existed between the Bay State Brewing and the registrant of the
existing TIME TRAVELER mark.158 In its decision, the TTAB
states that it must consider the impact of the consent agreement
in a likelihood of confusion analysis and summarizes that its
determination for rejecting analysis “is based on an analysis of all
of the facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on
the likelihood of confusion.”159
A. Description of du Pont Factors for Likelihood of Confusion
Analysis
The likelihood of consumer confusion is a question of fact.160
When a court performs a likelihood of confusion analysis, it must
consider each of the following factors if evidence has been
introduced into the record (“du Pont factors”): (1) the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties, (2) the similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in the
application or registration or in connection with which a prior
mark is in use, (3) the similarity or dissimilarity of established,
156. See supra Part I. (explaining the background of In re Bay State
Brewing).
157. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *1 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
158. See id. (“Applicant asserts that it has a consent agreement with
Registrant, and asserts that ‘the parties acknowledge that confusion is likely
unless they both adhere to the terms of the [agreement].’”).
159. Id. (citing In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A.
1973)).
160. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A.
1973) (explaining that there is “no litmus rule” in determining the likelihood of
consumer confusion, instead, each case must be decided on its own facts).
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likely-to-continue trade channels, (4) the conditions under which
and buyers to whom sales are made, (5) the fame of the prior mark,
(6) the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar
goods, (7) the nature and extent of any actual confusion, (8) the
length of time during and conditions under which there has been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion, (9) the variety
of goods on which a mark is or is not used, (10) the market interface
between applicant and owner of a prior mark, (11) the extent to
which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark,
(12) the extent of potential confusion, (13) any other established
fact probative of the effect of use.161 The factors are not listed in an
order of importance or merit and each may be used to play a
dominant role in the likelihood of confusion analysis.162
B. Likelihood of Confusion Analysis Applies to the Craft Brewing
Industry as a Whole
1. Similarity/Dissimilarity Between Applicant’s Goods and
Registrant’s Goods (Second du Pont Factor)
In In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc., the court first
considered the second du Pont factor which is focused on the
similarity between the Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods.163 In the
TTAB’s brief analysis of the second du Pont factor, it concludes
that the goods are identical because they are used for beer.164 The
TTAB took notice that the registrations were for use on two
different types of beer, with applicant’s mark to be used in
connection with an “ale” style beer and the registrant’s mark used
on “lager” style beers, however the TTAB concluded that because
these are merely types of beer, the goods are still identical.165 With
161. Id.
162. See id. at 1361–62 (providing examples of past cases where various
factors were used as the main determination in the likelihood of confusion
analysis).
163. See In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *1 (T.T.A.B.
2016) (explaining that the first factor that the TTAB considered was the second
du Pont factor and an examination of the type of goods).
164. See id. (“The goods are identical insofar as the identification in the
application and in the cited registration both include ‘beer.’”).
165. See id. (“The remaining goods in the cited registration, ‘ale’ and ‘lager’
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the TTAB’s approach that a beer is a beer, it is likely that in any
analysis between two craft brewers, this factor will always weigh
in favor of a likelihood of consumer confusion.166
2. Trade Channels and Purchasers (Third du Pont Factor)
After the TTAB concluded that the type of goods that the
marks were to be used for were identical, the TTAB proceeded to
analyze the third du Pont factor—concerning the similarity of
established, likely-to-continue trade channels.167 The TTAB notes
that there is an initial presumption that the trade channels and
purchasers are the same if the goods identified in the application
and the registration are at least in-part identical.168 It is important
to note that if the TTAB continues to find that all beers are
identical, it will likely be able to rely on such a presumption in any
dispute regarding two beers.169 In In re Bay State Brewing
Company, the TTAB defines the relevant trade channels as “liquor
stores, beer sections of grocery and convenience stores, and the
like, as well as bars and restaurants, and the customers would
include ordinary consumers.”170 The TTAB also proclaims to “take
judicial notice that beer is often relatively inexpensive, subject to
impulse purchase, and often ordered orally in a bar or
restaurant.”171 As a result, the TTAB finds that beer is held to a
lesser standard of purchasing and thus, the third du Pont factor
are otherwise closely related to, and in fact are types of beer.”).
166. See, e.g., In re Crow Hop Brewing Co., Ltd., 2016 WL 4775485 (T.T.A.B.
2016) (providing an example of the TTAB using the Bay State Brewing likelihood
for confusion analysis in another dispute between two breweries); In re Clipper
City Brewing Co., 2017 WL 412405 (T.T.A.B. 2017) (same).
167. See id. at *2 (explaining that the TTAB’s analysis concerned the
similarity of dissimilarity of trade channels for the applicant’s and registrant’s
goods).
168. See In re Viterra Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(providing that even though there was no evidence regarding channels of trade
and classes of consumers, the Board was entitled to rely on such a presumption
in determining the likelihood of confusion).
169. See, e.g., In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 159 USPQ 721, 723 (C.C.P.A.
1968) (demonstrating that where there are legally identical goods, the channels
of trade and classes of purchasers are considered to be the same).
170. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *2 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
171. Id.
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weighs in favor of the TTAB finding a likelihood of consumer
confusion.172 However, what the TTAB has failed to consider is that
is that the average craft beer drinker is not simply the average
beer drinker.173 Therefore, there is a potential argument that
decisions regarding the purchase of craft beer are made by
informed individuals, seeking a specific product, and as a result,
these individuals would not be as likely to be confused.174
3. Similarity Between the Marks (First du Pont Factor)
The third aspect that the TTAB considered in its analysis was
the first du Pont factor—“the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and
impression.”175 The standard for comparing the similarity between
two marks involves comparing “them in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression to
determine the similarity or dissimilarity between them.”176 The
purpose of the inquiry is to determine “whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such
that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume
a connection between the parties.”177 The TTAB builds on its
analysis that because the goods are identical (essentially meaning
that both products are beer), there is a lower standard needed to
determine that the similarity of the marks points in favor of
finding a likelihood of confusion.178
172. See id. at *2 (“When products are relatively low-priced and subject to
impulse buying, the risk of likelihood of confusion is increased because purchasers
of such products are held to a lesser standard of purchasing care.” (citing Recot
Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000))).
173. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that craft beer
resonates with a particular demographic, generally this demographic includes
individuals who are college educated with well-paying jobs).
174. See Reid et al., Conference Paper, supra note 60, at 5 (characterizing
craft beer as a “high order prestige good” that is “often viewed as highbrow” and
describing the craft beer consumer as “sophisticated” and “discerning”).
175. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
176. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *2 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
177. Id.
178. Id. at * 3 (“In comparing the marks, we are mindful that where, as here,
the goods are identical, the degree of similarity between the marks necessary to
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In its analysis, the TTAB notes that although marks are to be
compared in their entireties, one portion of the mark may be given
more or less weight in determining whether consumer confusion
will occur.179 In particular, when comparing TIME TRAVELER
BLONDE (applicant’s mark) and TIME TRAVELER (registrant’s
mark), the TTAB finds that the term BLONDE in the applicants
application is of a “highly descriptive or generic nature” as it
simply describes the type of beer.180 Because of its descriptive
nature, the TTAB concludes that BLONDE has no sourceindicating function and does “very little or nothing to distinguish”
the applicant’s mark from the registrant’s.181 To further support
its conclusion that the term BLONDE does not distinguish the two
marks, the TTAB notes that it is common for consumers to shorten
marks.182 This propensity to shorten marks is particularly relevant
for goods such as beer because “[b]eer is often ordered by name, in
a bar or restaurant, or from a menu, where only the name of the
beer will be used (in this case, TIME TRAVELER).”183 Further, the
TTAB does not consider how the term may affect the appearance
of the mark on its label because many consumers who purchase
these beers are “ordering these goods from a bartender or
waiter/waitress will not have the opportunity to see a label when
they order the product. Further, if the beer is served in a glass
find likelihood of confusion need not be as great as where there is a recognizable
disparity between the goods.”).
179. See id. at *3 (“Although marks must be considered in their entireties, it
is settled that one feature of a mark may be more significant than another, and it
is not improper to give more weight to this dominant feature in determining the
commercial impression created by the mark.”); see also In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753
F.2d, 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]here is nothing improper in stating that, for
rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a
mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in
their entireties. Indeed, this type of analysis appears to be unavoidable.”).
180. See id. at n.5 (acknowledging that beers that are very pale in color are
described as “blonde” and these beers “tend to be clear, crisp, and dry, with lowto-medium bitterness and aroma from hops, and some sweetness from malt”).
181. See id. at *3 (comparing BLONDE to the descriptive term CAFE in In
re Dixie Rests, Inc., 105 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997) where the court found that
DELTA was the dominant potion of the mark THE DELTA CAFE).
182. See id. (“That is to say, when Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks are
considered in their entireties, the term BLONDE does very little or nothing to
distinguish them. In saying this, we also keep in mind the penchant of consumers
to shorten marks.”).
183. Id. at *4.
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because it is a draft beer . . . the consumer may never be able to see
the label” and as a result will not be able to recognize the difference
that the marks portray when used on their respective products.184
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The two labels, which appear above in Figure IV.B.4185 appear
markedly different, however, the TTAB presumes they are
virtually identical in appearance “insofar as they both are
standard character marks.”186 Furthermore, even when
considering the full mark TIME TRAVELER BLONDE, the TTAB
concluded that the mark was “virtually identical in sound” to the
registrant’s TIME TRAVELER mark.187 Additionally, the TTAB
found that both marks are arbitrary in relation to their respective
goods, meaning that neither mark appears to be related to beer.188
As a result of this arbitrariness, the TTAB concluded that there is
nothing in the applicant’s mark that would suggest “or create a
different commercial impression, when used on Applicant’s goods,
as compared to Registrant’s goods.”189 Thus, the TTAB found that
the similarity of the marks—the first du Pont factor—“weighs
heavily in favor of a finding of a likelihood of confusion.”190
4. Weighing du Pont Factors Against the Consent Agreement
between Applicant and Registrant
Overall, the TTAB’s likelihood of confusion analysis would
apply to the craft brewing industry as a whole.191 The TTAB built
its analysis on the cornerstone that the applicant’s and registrant’s
goods were virtually identical—meaning that because both marks
were to be used for beer, there was a lower threshold necessary in
the likelihood of confusion analysis.192 In fact, TTAB concludes,
184. Id.
185. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *6 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
186. Id. at *4.
187. Id.
188. See id. (explaining that the two marks “would be even closer in meaning
and overall commercial impression” given the arbitrary nature of TIME
TRAVELER, as the two marks would be “used for the identical goods”).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See e.g., In re Crow Hop Brewing Co., Ltd., 2016 WL 4775485 (T.T.A.B.
2016) (providing an example of the TTAB using the Bay State Brewing likelihood
for confusion analysis in another dispute between two breweries); In re Clipper
City Brewing Co., 2017 WL 412405 (T.T.A.B. 2017) (same).
192. See, e.g., id. at *2 (“Because the goods identified in the application and
the cited registration are at least in-part identical, we must presume that the
channels of the trade and classes of purchasers are the same.”).
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“[a]bsent other du Pont factors, the virtual identity in the marks,
and the identity in the goods, trade channels, and purchasers,
along with the impulse nature of purchases of beer, presents a
compelling case for finding a likelihood of confusion.”193 The TTAB
then proceeds to consider the impact that the trademark
coexistence agreement in this case will have on the likelihood of
confusion factors.194
V. Examination of Specific Trademark Coexistence Agreement in
In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc. and the Implications for
Future Coexistence Agreements in the Craft Brewing Industry
This section discusses the TTAB review of the specific
trademark coexistence agreement that was submitted with the
application to register TIME TRAVELER BLONDE.195 As
examined earlier in this Note, many judicial bodies, including the
TTAB have reviewed coexistence agreements with great
deference.196 In fact, the TTAB itself has viewed coexistence
agreements as contracts has concerned itself with contractual
issues, such an ambiguity and consideration.197 The analysis of In
re Bay State Brewing Company appears to stray from the approach
of the past as the Examiner and the TTAB view the agreement
with a higher level of scrutiny—ultimately making the agreement
useless in the current registration process.198
193. Id. at *4.
194. See id. at *4 (explaining that when there is a consent agreement
between the applicant and the registrant in a case, the TTAB is to consider the
agreement in light of balancing the likelihood of confusion factors).
195. See id. at *1 (discussing that the “existence of a coexistence agreement
relates to one of the du Pont factors, namely the market interface between
Applicant and Registrant” and that the TTAB must consider the impact of the
agreement after considering the other factors).
196. See, e.g., Bongrain Int’l Corp. v. Delice De France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479,
1484–85 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (providing an example of the Federal Circuit setting a
very deferential standard to the parties involved in a trademark coexistence
agreement when the court reviews such an agreement).
197. See, e.g., Ron Cauldwell Jewelry, Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes, Inc., 2002
WL 745591, *5 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (providing an example of the TTAB reviewing a
trademark coexistence agreement under contractual standards).
198. See In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *10 (T.T.A.B.
2016) (“Notwithstanding the consent agreement, we are persuaded that
patrons . . . are likely to be confused as to source upon encountering the
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In its opinion, the TTAB does, in fact, acknowledge the
importance of consent agreements in the likelihood of confusion
analysis.199 The TTAB further emphasizes that only “few [consent
agreements] may be found lacking”—meaning that are few consent
agreements that do not satisfy the standard to prevail in a
likelihood of confusion analysis—but insists that there is no firm
rule that consent agreements will always contravene refusal on
grounds of confusion.200 The TTAB based its rationale largely on
the fact that it reads In re Mastic Inc.201 to teach that there is “no
per se rule that a consent, whatever its terms, will always tip the
balance to finding no likelihood of confusion, and it therefore
follows that the content of each agreement must be examined.”202
It is important to note that this differs from the approach that the
TTAB took in Ron Cauldwell Jewelry, a case decided 15 years after
In re Mastic Inc., when it simply reviewed whether the agreement
was unambiguous and contained consideration.203 Furthermore,
while In re Mastic Inc. does provide an example where the Federal
Circuit affirmed a TTAB order that denied applicant registration
in light of a consent agreement—the case and consent agreement,
are much different from In re Bay State Brewing. In In re Mastic
Inc., the “consent [agreement] was a ‘naked’ consent without any
restrictions or limitations on either the applicant or registrant
with respect to marketing channels, purchasers, or users.”204 To
support its conclusion, the Federal Circuit noted that the
agreement submitted in In re Mastic Inc. “does not evidence a
bilateral ‘agreement’” because the agreement is “simply a

marks . . . even when these marks are used within the constraints set forth in the
consent agreement.”).
199. See id. at *6 (citing to In re Wacker Neuson SE, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1048,
1411–12 (T.T.A.B. 2010) to acknowledge that the TTAB is aware of precedence
demonstrating the importance of consent agreements in the likelihood of
confusion analysis).
200. See id. at *6 (explaining that it is “not a foregone conclusion” that all
consent agreements will be “determinative” in establishing that there will not be
a likelihood of confusion).
201. 829 F.2d 1114 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (affirming TTAB refusal to register
trademark “SHURLOCK” on the basis of likelihood of confusion).
202. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *6 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
203. See supra notes 130–140 and accompanying text.
204. In re Mastic Inc., 829 F.2d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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statement signed on behalf of [registrant].”205 Therefore, because
the agreement did not demonstrate that the parties entered into a
likelihood of confusion determination, the court did not grant it
significant weight in its likelihood of confusion analysis.206 An
analysis of the consent agreement submitted in In re Bay State
Brewing Company will demonstrate that the consent agreement is
much more thorough and contemplated than the one submitted in
In re Mastic.
A. The Consent Agreement Submitted in In re Bay State Brewing
Company was a Long Form Agreement
Initially, the applicant submitted a Short Form Agreement for
review in the application of the mark TIME TRAVELER
BLONDE.207 This short agreement was “intended to be made of
public record with the Patent and Trademark Office” and due to
the consequences of publishing documents in public record, did not
contain all of the bargained upon terms.208 Upon denial of the short
agreement, a Long Form Agreement, which was claimed to have
been intended solely for the internal use of the parties, was
submitted for examination.209 If a consent agreement is used to
overcome a likelihood of confusion analysis, then it is necessary to
become public record to provide public notice as to why the USPTO
allowed registration.210 Therefore, from a practical standpoint, it is
important to have an adequate agreement while not disclosing
information intended to be confidential.
205. Id. at 1117.
206. See id. (“There are no undertakings of record between the parties which
enter into the likelihood of confusion determination, and the board did not err in
giving that [‘naked’] characterization to the consent.”).
207. See In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *6 (T.T.A.B.
2016) (explaining how the record developed to include both a short form and a
long from consent agreement).
208. See id. (discussing why two different forms of the consent agreement
were drafted and provided to the USPTO).
209. See id. (“[T]he Long Form Agreement is a lengthier, more detailed
agreement and it is appropriate that Applicant and the Examining Attorney have
focused their attention on this agreement.”).
210. See id. at *4, n. 6 (describing that coexistence agreements take on extra
significance if used to overcome a likelihood of confusion analysis).
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Applicants, Bay State Brewing, argue that it and the
registrant made “reasoned assessments of the marketplace” in the
detailed, long form agreement.211 As a result of these assessments,
the applicants believe that the agreement “is a non-naked, wellreasoned and detailed agreement crafted by knowledgeable parties
intimately familiar with the market and eager to avoid
confusion.”212 The applicant’s argument followed that because the
agreement was well reasoned by the two parties in the
marketplace, that it should be “given the substantial and great
weight as required by the Federal Circuit.”213 Despite the
applicant’s arguments, the Examining Attorney reviewed the
agreement in detail and found its pertinent terms
“inaccurate . . . irrelevant . . . or legally insignificant.”214 In
making his or her determination that the consent agreement was
lacking, the examining attorney relied on In re Mastic Inc.215 The
examining attorney also described and reviewed the relevant
sections to the consent agreement—these sections will be
discussed below.
B. Specific Sections of Bay State Brewing’s Trademark Consent
Agreement
It is important to note that when considering the specific
provisions of Bay State Brewing’s consent agreement, there are
two overriding purposes for the parties entering into the
agreement.216 First, the applicant and the registrant “‘wish to
avoid any conflict with one another and consent to co-exist’ under
211. See id. (describing why applicants believe that the USPTO has not
shown “good reason” to substitute its own determination for the likelihood of
confusion with that of the parties involved).
212. Id. (explaining further that “the parties crafted an agreement designed
to avoid confusion in the marketplace and underscored the agreement with a
mutual commitment to collaborate in avoiding confusion in the marketplace”).
213. Id.
214. Id. at *5.
215. See id. (focusing on language in the case that indicates that there are
instances where a consent agreement may not lead to overcoming the likelihood
of confusion analysis). For a discussion of the case that the examining attorney
relied upon, see supra notes 204–206 and accompanying text.
216. See id. at *6 (explaining the specifics of the consent agreement).
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certain terms and conditions.”217 Second, the parties provide that
they “agree to cooperate in good faith to resolve such actual
confusion and to develop measures sufficient to avoid a likelihood
of confusion.”218 The following sections are those that were deemed
important by the TTAB.
1.Restrictions on Use
The Restrictions on Use section of the agreement provides that
neither party will use its respective mark other than in connection
with the respective house mark.219 Additionally, the applicant
agreed that it will only use the entire mark, TIME TRAVELER
BLONDE, or simply BLONDE—it will not use the words TIME
TRAVELER (which is the registrant’s mark) in stand-alone
fashion.220 Further, the applicant states that it will use the term
BLONDE “in a manner that is equally as or more prominent than
the terms TIME and TRAVELER.”221 The parties also agree that
the applicant reserved the right to change the beer name to TIME
TRAVELER MAIBOCK, but it would still comply with the
stipulations agreed upon, simply substituting MAIBOCK for
BLONDE.222
In its analysis of this section of the agreement, the TTAB does
not find it persuasive that the two parties agreed only to use their
respective marks in connection with each house mark, as “the use
of a house mark does not obviate confusion.”223 Additionally, the
TTAB reads very deeply in the applicant reserving the right to
change its name and concludes that this provision demonstrates
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id. (discussing that the registrant agreed that it would not use the
mark other than in connection with its house mark (THE TRAVELER BEER CO.)
and the applicant agreed not to use its mark other than in connection with its
house mark (BAY STATE BREWING)).
220. See id. (addressing the applicant’s agreement on how it would use its
mark in production, sales, distribution, marketing, and licensing).
221. Id.
222. Id. (explaining the rights reserved by the applicant).
223. See id. (“We find, however, that the addition of house marks to these
virtually identical marks used on identical goods does not necessarily mean that
purchasers are not likely to be confused.”).
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that BLONDE (which differentiates the applicant’s and
registrant’s mark) is not an important aspect of the mark. 224
Therefore, even though the applicant is seeking to register its
mark as a whole, and even though the two breweries agreed to use
their marks in specific manners, the TTAB is assuming that the
applicant “is relying on TIME TRAVELER as its source
identifier.”225 Based on the precedential decisions explaining the
significant weight to be owed to such agreements, it seems a
stretch for the TTAB to read such assumptions into a private
contract between the two involved parties.
2. Geographical Limitations
The Geographical Limitation provision of the agreement reads
“Bay State [applicant] will not use TIME TRAVELER BLONDE
outside of New England and the State of New York.”226 In the
current case, the applicant is located in Massachusetts while the
registrant is located in Vermont.227 The TTAB was troubled with
the fact that the provision limited the applicant’s use to only New
England and the State of New York, while the registrant’s use was
not limited at all.228 The TTAB found this portion of the agreement
caused two problems.229
First, TTAB finds that even though the parties have provided
some sort of geographical limitations, they have essentially agreed
that “both marks will be used in overlapping areas,” namely New
England and New York.230 The TTAB notes that the applicant is
seeking nationwide registration, not a limited geographic

224. See id. at *8, n. 12 (questioning the fact that the applicant is willing to
substitute one “highly descriptive or generic term” for another).
225. Id.
226. Id. at *7.
227. See id. at *7 (explaining the TTAB’s trouble with the geographic
limitations that are provided within the consent agreement).
228. See id. at *7 (analyzing the geographic limitations imposed on both
parties via the agreed upon contract).
229. See id. (discussing the issues with this provision in the consent
agreement).
230. See id. (explaining that the agreement allows the registrant to use its
mark “within the entirety of the Applicant’s territory”).
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concurrent registration.231 If Bay State had been applying for a
concurrent registration, its registration would reflect a right to use
the mark in a limited geographic area.232 In Holmes Oil Company,
Inc. v. Myers Cruizers of Mena, Inc.,233 the TTAB articulated the
difference between a consent agreement and concurrent
registration:
In contrast, if the parties enter into a consent agreement, rather
than a concurrent use agreement, in order to overcome a refusal
of registration on the ground of likelihood of confusion, such an
agreement generally allows for each party's use in overlapping
territories and does not result in geographic restrictions being
placed on any party's registration, with the result being that
each party obtains an unrestricted registration, subject to the
parties’ consent agreement or contractual arrangement
concerning use and registration.234

The TTAB’s articulation of such a scenario gives deference to
use restrictions as part of the contract negotiation process of a
consent agreement and its willingness to register marks in
overlapping areas with a consent agreement in place.235
Nonetheless, in In re Bay State Brewing, the TTAB found it
problematic that the consent agreement allowed for overlapping
use.236
Second, the TTAB is concerned that if the applicant was
granted the nationwide registration that it sought, the registration
would not reflect the geographic limitations that the parties
voluntarily contracted for.237 Consequently, “although Applicant’s
231. See id. (“Here, Applicant is not seeking a concurrent use registration
(with a corresponding geographical restriction in Registrant’s registration), but
rather a nationwide registration.”).
232. See id. (discussing the ramifications of a concurrent use registration
application and proceeding).
233. 2011 WL 6780741 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
234. Id. at *2.
235. See id. (explaining that “although this case is captioned as a concurrent
use proceeding, it is only nominally one” as the parties have essentially entered
into a “traditional consent agreement” with overlapping registration in the
United States, minus Arkansas).
236. See In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *7 (T.T.A.B.
2016) (“Here, the reality is that even as Applicant is bound by its agreement with
Registrant, both marks will be used in overlapping geographical areas, namely
New England and New York.”).
237. See id. at *8 (explaining that “the geographical restrictions set forth in
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use, by the terms of the agreement, is limited to New England and
New York, a nationwide registration issued to Applicant would
give Applicant presumptive nationwide exclusive rights.”238 This
would cause the issue that the national register would not
accurately reflect the rights of the mark and thus would create
problems with notice to the public and attorneys searching the
register.239 Therefore, the TTAB determines that granting
nationwide registration while the agreement limits the geographic
scope of use, will be misleading and would undermine the
important public notice function of the national register.240
Although geographic restrictions were included in the consent
agreement, the TTAB is so strongly displeased by the geographic
restriction provision of the consent agreement that it states “in the
absence of geographical restrictions, the effectiveness of the other
provisions in this agreement is further diminished.”241 The TTAB
is implying its own judgment to the consent agreement that the
restrictions the parties have agreed upon are essentially
meaningless. Such a view by the TTAB threatens the use of
consent agreements within the craft brewing industry, especially
considering how the industry is in large part geographically
clustered.242
3. Trade Dress
The trade dress provision of the consent agreement between
the two parties provides that neither party will use “trade dress in
its packaging, labeling, and/or marketing” of their respective beer
in a manner “that is confusingly similar to the labeling, packaging,
marketing materials, or other images” used by the other party.243
the consent agreement are not reflected in the application”).
238. Id. at *8.
239. See id. at *8 (“[W]hen marks are being searched and cleared, there is a
presumption by searchers and attorneys afforded to an unrestricted registration
that Applicant’s registration would not and should not be entitled to.”).
240. See id. at *8, n.11 (discussing the harm that would be caused to the
registration system if both marks were on the register at the same time).
241. Id. at *8.
242. See discussion supra Part I.A.3. (explaining the geographical
distribution of craft breweries).
243. Id. at *6.
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The TTAB does not find this provision satisfactory as it believes
the language only requires “each party not to use the trade dress
of the other but do[es] not require the use of particular trade dress
by either party.”244 The TTAB criticizes this section of the
agreement because both marks are requesting registration for
standard character marks. Standard character marks are not
limited in presentation as they may be displayed in “any font, style,
size, or color.”245 The TTAB therefore concludes that the parties
could satisfy the trade dress agreement by displaying their marks
in numerous fashions—however this would not aid in avoiding
consumer confusion.246 Further, the TTAB places more weight on
trademark law than contract law principles and considers the
coexistence agreement as a representation of the applicant’s
“desire [for] a decision based on the mark, not as applied for, but
rather as promised” which would lead to further public notice
issues. 247 The TTAB explains that this agreement simply
represents a promise to use the mark in a certain manner (as the
mark is not currently in use)—a promise that would deviate from
the parameters of trademark application and registration and
would ultimately undermine the public notice functions of the
national trademark register.248 Ultimately, the TTAB decided that
the trade dress provision of the agreement would not help prevent
the likelihood of consumer confusion.249
While acknowledging the TTAB’s argument in regards to
public notice, one may consider that reviewing this consent
agreement from a strictly contractual standpoint could potentially
244. Id. at *8.
245. Id. (citing In re Viterra, Inc., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1905, 1910 (Fed. Cir.
2012)).
246. See id. at *8 (providing the example that the parties could use “minimal
trade dress and smaller font displays of the house marks” and the “essence of the
agreement would be met, but would not aid in the avoidance of confusion”).
247. Id.
248. See id. (“These promises as to trade dress and house mark usage
represent another deviation from the parameters of the application and
registration, and thus would result in a failure of the public notice function of the
registration.”).
249. See id. (explaining that even after reviewing the trade dress provisions,
the board is convinced a likelihood of confusion exists because of the use of
“virtually identical marks on identical goods that are subject to impulse purchase
by ordinary consumers in the same geographical area”).
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help alleviate confusion in regards to the trade dress use. Doing so
would place the burden on the parties involved in the action—
parties that are closer to consumers and have more incentive not
to have their marks confused—to initiate a suit for breach of
contract.250 The parties involved ultimately have more at stake
than the TTAB in insuring that their respective marks are not
used in a manner that is to be confused with the other.251 As a
result, the parties would self-regulate to ensure that the trade
dress used for each product did not cause public confusion.
4. Trademark Applications
The Trademark Application provision of the agreement
provides that neither the applicant nor the registrant will take
action to interfere with the other parties respective trademark
applications given that each party complies with the terms of the
contract.252 Furthermore, the parties agree to cooperate in
executing any further documentation that the USPTO requires to
validate the intent and the terms of the agreement in question.253
In its opinion, the TTAB did not shed light on this specific
provision, however, it should be noted that in the past, the TTAB
has considered a similar provision as adequate consideration for a
contract, and thus one of the factors making a consent agreement
a valid contract.254

250. Cf. Ron Cauldwell Jewelry, Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes, Inc., 2002 WL
745591, *5 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (explaining the parties’ unsuccessful complaint for a
breach of contract).
251. See Amalgamated Bank of N.Y. v. Amalgamated Tr. & Sav. Bank, 842
F.2d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining that businessmen stand a lot to lose
if their marks cause public confusion).
252. See id. at *7 (providing that aside from the registrant not taking any
action against the applicant for the current trademark, the applicant agrees not
to take action against the registrant for TIME TRAVELER or any current or
future application that uses the word TRAVELER).
253. See id. (replicating the terms of the trademark consent agreement
between the applicant and the registrant).
254. See, e.g., supra notes 138–140 (providing an example of a consent
agreement being analyzed for consideration).

150

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 103 (2017)
5. Likelihood of Confusion

The Likelihood of Confusion provision of the consent
agreement reads:
The parties hereby acknowledge that they believe that there
would not be a likelihood of confusion between the TIME
TRAVELER mark and the TIME TRAVELER BLONDE mark
if the parties comply with the terms of this Agreement. Should
actual consumer confusion between the parties’ products occur
in the future, however, the parties agree to cooperate in good
faith to resolve such actual confusion and to develop measures
sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion.255

In light of the above provision, the TTAB found that the
agreement is “sorely lacking in business information” that
demonstrates why the parties believe that the trademarks will not
cause consumer confusion if the terms of the agreement are
followed.256 The TTAB provides examples of what it means by
“business information” as it states “consent agreements often refer
to differences between the goods, trade channels and classes of
purchasers; the sophistication of purchasers; and dissimilar
methods of advertising and promotion.”257 The TTAB criticizes the
fact that the agreement is silent to such information, and takes the
stance that similar information must be explicitly stated in the
consent agreement and the TTAB is not in a position to infer the
business information.258 In making this assertion, the TTAB cites
Amalgamated Bank of New York v. Amalgamated Trust & Savings
Bank259—a case where the Federal Circuit reversed a TTAB’s
refusal to register a mark, even when there was a consent
agreement between the two parties.260 In Amalgamated, the
255. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *7 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
256. See id. at *8, n.13 (criticizing the agreement for its lack of business
information based on the “particular circumstances of their contemporaneous
use”).
257. Id.
258. See id. (“The agreement is silent on all of these points. Lest we be
accused of knowing more about the beer business than Applicant and Registrant
do, we are not in a position to infer business that is not specifically expressed in
the agreement.”).
259. 842 F.2d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
260. See id. at 1271 (explaining the reversal of the TTAB’s decision to deny
registration of the applicant’s service marks).
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Federal Circuit scolded the TTAB for relying on its own views
instead of the views expressed in the consent agreement by the
affected parties.261 This case does not appear to be authority to
support the TTAB’s position that all business information must be
clearly in the consent agreement. Instead, Amalgamated reiterates
the fact that substantial deference should be given to the parties
coexistence agreements that are entered into two business
parties.262 In fact, the Federal Circuit specifically recommended
that the board should “heed[] the admonition of the CCPA in
DuPont” that provides: “[d]ecisions of men who stand to lose if
wrong are normally more reliable than those of examiners and
judges. It can be safely taken as fundamental that reputable
businessmen-users of valuable trademarks have no interest in
causing public confusion.”263 Therefore, even the authority that the
TTAB cited in its own decision, indicates that the TTAB seems to
overstep it bounds in substituting its views for those of Bay State
Brewing and the registrant. Instead, the TTAB should have
followed Amalgamated, not substituted its own views, and
“suppose[d] that [the parties] have to know the habits of their
customers, and the application of such knowledge is implicit in the
agreement here involved.”264
VI. Conclusion
The craft brewing industry is a growing and healthy industry
in the United States. It is also a unique industry—one that has
capitalized on the development of community support and
established a collaborative, collegial atmosphere among fellow and
competing brewers. The atmosphere amongst brewers often
translates to how breweries interact with each other as they
261. See id. at 1275 (“The TTAB’s reliance on its own views regarding the
banking industry, rather than the views of the parties in question, contravenes
the scope and intent of this court’s precedent in DuPont and Bongrain. In fact,
the motions and agreement filed indicated the contrary to the board’s opinion.”).
262. See id. at 1273 (explaining that it is “difficult to maintain a subjective
view that confusion will occur when those directly concerned say it won’t.” (citing
In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1362–63 (C.C.P.A. 1973))).
263. Id. at 1275 (citing In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
1363 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
264. Id. at 1274.
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approach potential legal conflicts. Combining the collegiality of the
craft brewing industry with the fact that many breweries are
startup businesses that are not able to fund litigation
demonstrates the desire for many breweries to find means to avoid
litigation. One way that craft brewers attempt to avoid litigation
is to enter into trademark consent agreements—contracts that are
contemplated by the parties to prevent a likelihood of confusion
amongst consumers.
It has been longstanding precedent in nearly every
jurisdiction, including the Federal Circuit, and the TTAB, to give
great deference to consent agreements and to not substitute the
views of the judiciary for those of the parties whom enter into the
agreement. Therefore, it has been well-established that if a
consent agreement is well-reasoned and provides adequate
restrictions on the mark or marks considered, then it will be given
deference and both marks will likely be registered by the USPTO.
However, in the case of In re Bay State Brewing Company, the
TTAB steps away from the established and highly-deferential
standard of review for consent agreements and prevents the
registration of a mark in light of a detailed consent agreement.
While the TTAB does make a respectable argument regarding the
likelihood of confusion in the case, the divergence from the highly
deferential review threatens the future use of trademark
coexistence agreements in the craft brewing industry. Because the
TTAB’s analysis largely depends on the fact that both of the marks
are to be used for beer, it seems that the TTAB would reach the
result that it did in In re Bay State Brewing Company in any
dispute between two breweries. It appears that the only way a
consent agreement between two craft breweries would appease the
TTAB to allow registration would be in a case where the breweries
were in markedly different geographic areas. With craft beer
expanding at such a rapid pace and being distributed in a
numerous markets, it brings into question if the TTAB’s desire for
such “geographical distinctions” will ever be met by a consent
agreement between two breweries.
By any means, the TTAB’s decision in In re Bay State Brewing
Company will significantly reduce the use of trademark consent
agreements within the craft brewing industry. In an industry that
is so reliant on maintaining a reputable brand and associated
marks, the inability to enter into peaceful trademark consent
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agreements will naturally lead to an increase in litigation. The
increase in litigation will threaten the unique and collegial culture
that the expansion of the craft brewing has fostered. Furthermore,
the increase in litigation may hamper the development of many
smaller breweries and prevent the craft brewing industry from
expanding as it has recently. For the sake of the craft brewing
industry, the TTAB should return to reviewing coexistence
agreements as freely bargained for contracts and give them great
deference. In doing so, the TTAB should heed the advice of the
Federal Circuit and give “great weight” to consent agreements in
a likelihood of confusion analysis because the parties involved “are
in a much better position to know the real life situation than
bureaucrats or judges.”265

265. Bongrain Int’l Corp. v. Delice De France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1484–85
(Fed. Cir. 1987).

